Proposal 311 (Q5200)
From Nouns Dev
A Nouns proposal.
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Proposal 311 |
A Nouns proposal. |
Statements
2
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74
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Verbs Team Six Month Extension
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225,000
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2
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344.89
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0
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306
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Verbs team
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The Verbs Team is requesting a six-month extension to continue their work on the Nouns DAO project. They plan to focus on several new projects including the Nouns Governor, collaborat ions with leading crypto teams, and rank-choice proposals. They also aim to complete ongoing projects such as DAO V3, private voting wrap-up, and a frontend for fork DAOs.
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311
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14 June 2023
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18
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450,000
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6
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I love it. Would fund another two or three teams like this if it was an option. *sent from voter.wtf*
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reVoteWithReason from seneca.eth > Nouns is lucky to have Elad & David leading these efforts. Happy to see them come back for another 6 months with us! *sent from voter.wtf*
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Nouns smart contracts and infrastructure are a Public Luxury. Verbs are incredible stewards and innovators. *sent from voter.wtf*
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25
join a governance pool, learn more at https://federation.wtf
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Easy yes. Nouns doesnt evolve without Verbs.
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14
great core contributors helping usher us through various technically (and politically) difficult upgrades
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Worth paying a premium to get the right people for the job. Building public goods infrastructure that empowers Nouns to pioneer the delivery of public luxuries for the hypercommons. *sent from voter.wtf*
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On behalf of UglyDAO
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I am voting FOR the Verb team to continue their work. Great team, and we are lucky to have them! Regarding communication with the DAO, I watched the ETHDenver talk and found it very helpful. I would encourage creating small videos like this, where team members can explain key features using simple slides. This can effectively communicate important information to everyone in the DAO, including non-coders. Agreeing with what Wilson said earlier. Ill take this opportunity to also say that, whether it is code or content, I would be much happier voting for features or deliverables that represent a certain amount of time, rather than voting for open-ended terms or retainer contracts that include deliverables. It is a minor reframing, but I think it helps create better incentives and also dismisses the tendency to make a team seem official. That being said, I am really excited about the Verb teams work, and I am glad they are building those features that can help us scale Nouns and DAOs in general. Thank you for Streamer and excited about Nouns Governor and the propoasal editing period. Looking forward!
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I heavily agree with all that already has been said (esp what wilson wrote out in detail). one thing I wanted to add is that I think we should break out of the mold of a single governor. well likely need to keep a single auction house but theres no reason for us to not utilize multiple governors for different purposes. for example, since the historic success of prop 190 weve all known that droposals by the dao are a thing that can really work. it can be meaningful monetization for the public art created for both the artist and the dao and doesnt hinder the cc0 / all-public-access nature of the artwork while also allowing the dao to define what it views as canonical. amazing. we love that. HOWEVER, we havent been able to really utilize droposals at an internet pace well yet b/c the two week process of getting a prop onchain and then it getting through just breaks the whole vibe. but there is no reason that the droposal props need two weeks worth of rigor. it doesnt ask for funding. it doesnt change the smart contracts. it should be a separate governor that has lets say a 30% threshold (or whatever we think is enough to make something canon) and whenever that threshold is met the droposal goes through and nouns provenance stamp lands on the OE mint. that should be possible on a moments notice as long as enough voters agree. once we break out of the idea of a single governor then a number of these bottleneck issues or code base capture issues that have been raised can also be lessoned. different teams can be working on different governors. we can also just try something that would otherwise feel impossibly contentious. like once private voting is ready, we probably shouldnt argue about whether the main governor should adopt it. we should just deploy a governor with private voting, send a minimal amount of dao funds to it, then see what that experience is like! of course there should be commonalities between governors. if the verbs team builds out the NFT-first nouns governor as they propose here, then it would be best for everyone to share that base (and fork from there) so that the governance clients can easily support the multiple governors. but I think increasingly the real value prop of the verbs team might be in defining that base and evolving that base where a lot of experimentation can still occur by other teams from all the forks that serve different functions / experiments. excited for a multi governor world for nouns!
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Nouns is lucky to have Elad & David leading these efforts. Happy to see them come back for another 6 months with us! *sent from voter.wtf*
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Am excited to vote FOR this proposal, and want to use my vote to flesh out some of my thinking on the topic of how I think about developing the DAO, code-wise. I would prefer that Nouns onchain code changes are driven in two ways: 1. The DAO decides that it wants to make some changes, and then solicits quotes or runs a prop house for ideas on how to implement the change. 2. Teams make direct proposals to the DAO on code changes *they* think should be made, and the DAO funds them to work on it. In either case, I think the DAO should be driving changes and should generally be voting on a per feature basis. I dislike funding teams in an open ended way for a few reasons 1. I think it becomes unclear to outsiders what is and isnt being worked on, and how they can get involved. Anything important to the DAO will be taken on by a funded team with an open mandate. Which in a way is great: talented people are ready to work on stuff! But I also think can feel like capture of the codebase. 2. I am not sure how much the DAO code should be changing, and on what frequency. If teams are funded to work on stuff, they’ll find stuff to do, but it’s not guaranteed that the DAO would vote to have each of those things worked on, if it was up to them. 3. Finally, it often ends up that features get bundled together in updates, and it makes it hard for DAO members to make voting decisions. That all said, there are practicalities at play. Most good devs want some stability. They do not want to need to get funding feature to feature. And also, due to the nature of how smart contracts are developed, it is efficient to bundle things into a single audit. So, to the case at hand. With Verbs we have great devs, who have been with Nouns nearly since the start, and have done great work. The pay is high, but is on par for staff engineer levels of salary + equity, and I think high pay is to be expected for the uncertain nature of this job (will you get funded again in six months?) and the lack of things like health benefits. I read this proposal and think it mostly falls in category (2) above—“Teams make direct proposals to the DAO on code changes *they* think should be made, and the DAO funds them to work on it.” I think an NFT-first governor is important, I think seeing through the Fork is important, tips to governance clients, undo votes, and price oracle would be nice to ha
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nom nom verbs upgrades for the win, this team has shown they are dedicated to the DAO and very capable and passionate.
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For - Wins **FOR - 27 VOTES** **AGAINST - 9 VOTES** **eltonpenguin** | *Unclear what the impact is of this spend* **ABSTAINS - 4 VOTES**
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Strongly in favor of the governance tooling the Verb team makes. Specifically, this proposals allocation towards Nouns governor as well as private voting will be critical not only as utilities towards the Nouns DAO, but also as a early design for other DAOs as the space overall moves beyond EOA-first product design and towards other abstractions (EIP 4337, 6551) that will be needed to scale ethereum utility to more users and use cases. *sent from voter.wtf*
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20
(noun40 voting via agora proxy)
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Our abstention vote is not a sign of disapproval, but rather a reflection of our principle of never casting a vote in favor. In reality, we highly value their work. 1. We acknowledge David and Elad as top-notch, native Hackers with the talent and self-awareness to create industry-standard code. We endorse the plan by Nouns Governo,, which is building a more advanced module architecture for NFT governance. Nouns DAO has consistently been leading the standards of NFT governance, which is one of the reasons we love Nouns. 2. Our only concern is that the development of NounsDAOs core smart contracts relies solely on one team. We hope that more teams will join the exploration of NounsDAOs governance standards in the future. Also, the abstraction of the work makes it difficult for the community to understand its impact. However, this is not a problem of David & Elads. In fact, NounsDAO is very fortunate to be able to work with them.
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Is it not the opposite? Inactive folks burn their tokens for eth, which I then assume lowers base quorum? Making the required amount of nouns to 51% attack lower and lower?
Ragequit is being worked on for the purpose of protecting the DAO from a 51% attack. The goal is not to act as a book value protector, but rather as a last resort defense with minimal financial side effects. The team is exploring design options to achieve this, including requiring a minimal amount of Nouns voting opposite of the outcome of a proposal as a condition for ragequitting. They are open to considering other design options and ways to protect against 51% attacks.
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Suboptimal thinking you say?-But why wouldn’t the recent buyers then hit that button and redeem extra Ξ from treasury and repeat until bv is “fixed”… in the process, pocketing the treasury Ξ for doing nothing for the DAO?
Ragequit is being worked on for the purpose of protecting the DAO from a 51% attack, not as a book value protector. The goal is to keep ragequit as a last resort defense while having as little financial side effects as possible. Some options being considered involve allowing ragequit only if a minimal amount of nouns vote opposite of the outcome of a proposal. The team is open to exploring more design options and other ways to protect against 51% attacks.
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